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Abstract
Economic theory predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in finitely
repeated games such as a prisoners' dilemma game without communication.   Yet
experimental results follow a contradicting pattern: for example, cooperation is generally
observed in public-goods experiments, at least in early rounds.  This cooperation is often
interpreted as kindness or fairness.  In an experiment on a voluntary participation game
with a non-excludable public good that is a version of a Hawk-Dove game, we observed
that evolutionary stable strategies did not appear, but cooperation emerged through a
transmutation from the Hawk-Dove game to a game where a dominant strategy outcome
is Pareto efficient.  We found that this transmutation is not due to kindness, but to
spitefulness among subjects.
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11. Introduction
Economic theory usually predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in
finitely repeated games such as a prisoners' dilemma game without communication.2  Yet
experimental results follow a contradicting pattern: some cooperation is generally
observed in public-goods experiments, for example, particularly in early rounds (see
Ledyard, 1995).  This cooperation is often interpreted as kindness or fairness.  Andreoni
(1995) confirmed that it comes from kindness or altruism of subjects.  Most previous
public goods experiments employ the voluntary contribution mechanism, in which each
subject contributes some money to provide a public good so as to maximize her payoff or
utility.  A well-established theoretical result is that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the
voluntary contribution mechanism are not Pareto efficient.
Another line of experimental research in public goods is to investigate
performance of mechanisms achieving Pareto efficient outcomes such as the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism (1977).  As Chen and Plott (1993) showed, the Groves-Ledyard
mechanism works very well under some suitable punishment parameters.
Recently, Saijo and Yamato (1997, 1999) shed a new light on the meaning of
voluntary participation in public goods provision mechanisms.  Agents may have a choice
not to participate in the mechanism proposed and hence some of them can free-ride on the
benefit from a public good provided by others.  In other words, most of the mechanisms
designed so far -- including the voluntary contribution mechanism -- implicitly ignore
non-excludability, which is one of the important features of a public good.  Instead,
designers assume that all agents must participate in the mechanism. Saijo and Yamato
                                                          
2 Many theorists have been trying to explain cooperation with finitely repeated games.  A basic idea is to
introduce some irrationality with or without complete information.  See Radner (1980), Kreps, Milgrom and
Wilson (1982), Benoit and Krishna (1985), and Conlon (1996).
2(1997) proved an impossibility theorem demonstrating that no mechanism satisfying
voluntary participation exists in very reasonable environments.3
This participation problem is important in many practical circumstances, such as
for international treaties.  For example, it took 24 years to reach agreement on the
disposition of chemical weapons in the chemical weapons treaty, and the number of
signatories was more than 160 by the end of 1995.  The treaty is a mechanism creating a
public good, i.e., a greater likelihood of world peace.  The treaty requires that at least 65
signatories must ratify it in order to make it effective.  In October 1996, Hungary was the
65th country to ratify it, and the treaty was effective after a half year.  However, China
and Russia have the most chemical weapons have not ratified this treaty.  This could limit
the treaty's effectiveness.  Another example is the League of Nations.  Following World
War I President Woodrow Wilson strongly supported the League, but the U.S. Congress
never ratified the Treaty of Versailles.  Another more contemporary example is the Kyoto
Protocol on climate change in 1997 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  A large number
of countries appear unwilling to participate in the provision of this obviously non-
excludable public good.
Voluntary public goods provision by individuals -- such as for public broadcasting
-- also faces this participation problem.  For example, part of public broadcasting in Japan
is supported by the public broadcasting fee.  Every family must pay the fee by law, but
many choose not to since enforcement is practically non-existent.  A natural question to
ask is what would happen if we allow voluntary participation in the voluntary
contribution mechanism.
We conducted an experiment to study the voluntary contribution mechanism with
voluntary participation in a two-stage game.  In the first stage, two subjects choose
                                                          
3 See also Dixit and Olson (1997) for the voluntary participation problem in the context of the Coase theorem.
3simultaneously whether or not they participate in the voluntary contribution mechanism.
In the second stage, knowing the other subject's participation decision, subjects who
selected participation in the first stage choose contributions to the public good.  Subjects
receive payoffs based on a Cobb-Douglas transformation of their consumption of the
public good and their private good.  The normal form game representation of the first
stage participation decision is a Hawk-Dove game rather than the Prisoners’ Dilemma
game that represents the typical voluntary contributions mechanism with mandatory
participation.  As usual, this Hawk-Dove game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria and
one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium which is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) equilibrium.
We conducted two treatments.  Both subjects were required to participate in the
voluntary contribution mechanism in the control Treatment A.  Each subject could choose
her participation decision before her contribution decision in Treatment B.  Thus,
Treatment A only included the second stage, while Treatment B included both stages.
Each treatment had twenty subjects and each subject was randomly paired with each
other subject one at a time – a so-called “strangers” design.  The same game was repeated
19 rounds, 4 for practice and 15 for monetary reward, so as not to pair the same two
subjects more than once.
In Treatment A, subjects on average contributed (or "invested") close to the Nash
equilibrium level, although some subjects exhibited spiteful behavior.  A spiteful subject
explicitly stated on her record sheet that she chose an investment number less than the
Nash equilibrium investment so as to reduce her opponent's payoff more than her own
payoff reduction.4
                                                          
4 Saijo and Nakamura (1995) observed spiteful behavior in a traditional voluntary contribution mechanism
experiment.  See also Ito, Saijo, and Une (1995).  Spiteful behavior is also observed in biology.  Iwasa,
4In Treatment B, the participation rate rose as rounds advanced, and the average
investment in the final rounds in Treatment B was very close to that in Treatment A.
Consequently, in the final two-thirds of Treatment B, subjects' participation rate nearly
always exceeded the ESS participation rate.  A typical subject behaved as follows: at the
beginning she did not participate in the mechanism, expecting high payoff with free-
riding.  However, her opponent who decided to participate in the mechanism did not
invest the number that maximized his own payoff.  Rather, he invested a smaller amount
so as to reduce his opponent's payoff more than his own payoff reduction.  The non-
participating subject thus learned that non-participation was not beneficial to her and
hence she began regularly participating in the mechanism.  That is, it seemed that the
source of cooperation was not altruism or kindness but was a payoff-maximizing response
to the spiteful behavior of other subjects.  What we call cooperation here means that both
subjects participate in the mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the
voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without voluntary participation.  Section 3
describes the experimental design.  We present the results on the experiment of the
voluntary contribution mechanism without voluntary participation in Section 4 and those
on the experiment of the voluntary contribution mechanism with voluntary participation
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
We employ the voluntary contribution mechanism with or without voluntary
participation as our model.
                                                                                                                                                                                
Nakamaru, and Levin (1998) set up a model explaining spiteful behavior of colicin-producing bacteria against
colicin-sensitive bacteria.
5There are two subjects, a and b, and subject i (=a,b) has wi  units of initial
endowment of a private good.  Each subject faces a decision of splitting wi  between her
own consumption of the private good ( xi ) and investment ( yi ).  From the investment,
each subject receives y y y wa b y= + + , where wy  is the initial level of the pubic good.
That is, the level of the public good is the sum of the investments of two subjects and the
initial level of the public good.  Therefore, each subject's decision problem is
max ( , )u x yi i  subject to x y wi i i+ = ,
where u x yi i( , )  is subject i's payoff function.  We use a Cobb-Douglas type payoff function
to transform contributions and the private good into subject payoffs, and all subjects have
the same payoff function.  That is, u x y x yi i i( , ) =
−α α1 , where α ∈( , ).0 1   Using a monotonic
transformation, we specify the payoff function as follows:
(1)                                       u x y x yi i i( , )
{ }
= +
−α α β1
50
500 .
In our experiment we set ( , , ) ( , , )w w wa b y = 24 24 3 , α = 0 47. , and β = 4 45. .  With these
parameters the Nash equilibrium investment pair of the voluntary contribution
mechanism is (  ,  )y ya b  = ( . , . )7 69 7 69  and the payoff is u x yi i(  ,  ) = 7089 , where
 . .xi = − =24 7 69 16 31 and    .y y y wa b y= + + = 18 38 . The Pareto efficient level of the public
good is determined uniquely by the Samuelson condition and the feasibility condition.  Its
symmetric contribution level is 12.02.  Therefore, the Pareto efficient level of the public
good is 27.04=12.02+12.02+3.  Clearly, the level of the public good with the voluntary
contribution mechanism is less than the Pareto efficient level of the public good.
6So far we have assumed implicitly that subjects must participate in the voluntary
contribution mechanism.  Saijo and Yamato (1997) found that there is a wide class of
mechanisms with public goods where subjects have incentives not to participate.  The
voluntary contribution mechanism is one of them.  That is, the voluntary contribution
mechanism is not voluntary from the viewpoint of participation incentives.
Consider now a two-stage game (see Figure 1).  In the first stage, each subject
simultaneously decides whether or not she should participate in the voluntary
contribution mechanism without knowing the other subject's decision.  In the second
stage, each subject decides how many units of her initial endowment she should invest
after knowing the other subject's participation decision.
--------------------------------
Figure 1 is around here
--------------------------------
Notice that non-participation is different from zero investment with participation.
Once subject a decides to participate in the mechanism, subject b must take account of this
fact when she chooses her investment number without knowing subject a's investment
number.  On the other hand, if subject a chooses non-participation, then subject b knows
that subject a invests nothing.
In our experiment, subjects choose integer investment numbers only.  If both
subjects decide to participate in the mechanism, then the Nash equilibrium of that
subgame is for each subject to contribute 8 and obtain a payoff of 7345.  No other Nash
equilibria sneak into our model due to the discrete strategy choice set.  If one subject
participates in the mechanism and the other does not, then the participant maximizes her
payoff at yi = 11  and obtains a payoff of 2658, and the non-participant clearly invests
nothing and obtains a payoff of 8278.  If both choose not to participate in the mechanism,
7both subjects end up with a payoff of 706.  These payoffs are summarized in the normal
form game payoff table shown in Table 1.
 --------------------------------
Table 1 is around here
--------------------------------
The game in Table 1 is a well-known Hawk-Dove game.  Although the usual
simplification of the public good problem is a Prisoners' Dilemma game, we find that the
proper simplification is a Hawk-Dove game when we allow participation in the
mechanism as a choice variable.  There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: either one of
subjects participates in the mechanism.  One more Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy
equilibrium: each subject i chooses 0.68 as her participation probability pi .  Among these
three equilibria, the mixed strategy equilibrium is a unique ESS equilibrium.5
3. Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of three treatments, A, B, and B’. Treatment A
corresponded to the voluntary contribution mechanism without voluntary participation
and Treatments B and B’ corresponded to the voluntary contribution mechanism with
voluntary participation.  We will explain the difference between Treatment B and
Treatment B’ below.
We conducted one session in Treatment A and one session in Treatment B at the
University of Tsukuba during December of 1995, and one session in Treatment B and one
session in Treatment B’ at the Tokyo Metropolitan University during December of 1997.
We recruited twenty students for each session by campus-wide advertisement.  These
students were told that there would be an opportunity to earn money in a research
                                                          
5 See Maynard Smith (1982).
8experiment.  None of them had prior experience in a public good provision experiment.
No subject attended in more than one session.  The Treatment A session required
approximately 90 minutes and the Treatment B and B’ sessions required approximately
two hours to complete.  The mean payoff per subject was $26.31 ($1=100 yen).  The
maximum payoff among the eighty subjects was $36.25, and the minimum payoff was
$17.28.
Let us describe Treatment A first.  Twenty subjects seated at desks in a relatively
large room had identification numbers between one to twenty randomly.  These
identification numbers were not publicly displayed, however, so subjects could not
determine who had which number.  We made ten pairs out of twenty subjects.  In each
round, ten pairs played the game without the participation decision as described in the
previous section.  The pairings were determined in advance by experimenters so as not to
pair the same two subjects more than once.  The first four rounds were for practice and the
remaining fifteen determined the subjects' monetary payoffs.  Each subject received an
experimental procedure sheet, a record sheet, payoff tables, 15 investment sheets, and 4
practice investment sheets.6  Instructions were given by tape recorder to minimize the
interaction between subjects and experimenters.  Each subject determined her investment
from an integer number between 0 and 24 by using payoff tables and then marked a
number on an investment sheet.  Experimenters collected these investment sheets and
then redistributed them to the paired subjects.  During the redistribution, subjects were
asked to fill out the reasons why they chose these numbers.  After the redistribution,
subjects calculated their payoffs from the payoff tables.  Then the next round started.
                                                          
6 The use of practice periods permits subjects to send signals costlessly prior to the paid rounds.  However,
subjects interacted with each other in only one period and there was no public information after the
instructions were completed and data collection began.  Therefore, the impact of these signals is somewhat
limited.  Nevertheless, see footnote 14 for some minor evidence of spillover from the practice periods.
9Treatment B had one additional step.  Before choosing investment numbers,
subjects decided whether or not they would participate in the voluntary contribution
mechanism.  These decisions were collected by experimenters and then redistributed to
their paired subjects.  After this procedure, subjects who decided to participate in the
mechanism chose their investment numbers.
Treatment B’ is exactly the same as Treatment B except what term was used to
describe the person that each subject is matched with at each period.  The term "your
opponent" was employed in the instructions, record sheets and payoff tables for both
Treatment A and Treatment B.  The phrase "the person you are paired with" replaced
"your opponent" in all materials of Treatment B’.  One might say that the term “opponent”
forces subjects to think in relative terms.  However, there was no essential difference
between the results for Treatment B and those for Treatment B’, as we document below.
Every subject had the same payoff function and every subject knew this fact.  We
distributed three kinds of payoff tables to avoid any possible misunderstanding.  The
payoff tables used in Treatments A and B are Tables 2, 3, and 4.  Table 2 is a detailed
payoff table: the rows are for the subject's own investment numbers and the columns are
for the other subject's investment numbers.  Table 3 is a rough payoff table and Table 4 has
an iso-payoff map.  The payoff tables distributed in Treatment B’ are the same as Tables 2,
3, and 4 except that the term "your opponent" is replaced by the term "the person you are
paired with".
We allowed subjects three minutes to examine the three payoff tables before the
practice rounds and ten minutes to examine the three new payoff tables before the real
rounds.  The tables used for practice and real rounds were different.
 ---------------------------------------------
Tables 2, 3 and 4 are around here
---------------------------------------------
10
We declared that the experiment would be stopped if communication among the
subjects was observed.  This never happened.
4. Experimental Results for Treatment A     
Treatment A was a control treatment intended to permit a comparison between
mandatory participation and voluntary participation.
The Nash equilibrium investment pair was (8, 8) from Table 2, and no other Nash
equilibrium exists.  Since each round had 10 pairs and 15 rounds were conducted, we have
150 pairs of data. The order of investment numbers does not matter, so we rearranged
each pair (x,y)  with x y≥ .  Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of investment data.
The maximum frequency pair was (8, 8) with 36 pairs, the second was (8, 7) with 35 pairs,
the third was (8,6) with 14 pairs, and the fourth was (7, 7) with 11 pairs.  The average
investment across all subjects was 7.24.
--------------------------------
Figure 2 is around here
--------------------------------
Figure 3 shows the average investment pattern from round 1 to 15.  The average
investment was less than the Nash equilibrium level of investment (8) in all but one round.
In order to understand why this happened, we checked the record sheets and
questionnaire sheets of subjects.  The record sheet was not only for keeping the
investment record but also for specifying the reasons why a subject chose her investment
numbers.  We found four subjects who explicitly stated the following reasoning: they
estimated that their opponent would chose 8, and then they chose 6 or 7 explicitly because
this would make their opponent's payoff much lower than their own payoff.  For example,
11
consider the case that subject a chooses 7 and subject b chooses 8.  Then subject a obtains
7340, and subject b obtains 6526.  At the Nash equilibrium (8, 8), both subjects obtain 7345.
From the viewpoint of subject a, the reduction of 5 units of payoff is minor, but subject a
can make the reduction of subject b's payoff (819) much greater than his own reduction.7, 8
We label these subjects as spiteful subjects, and Figure 3 also presents mean investments
after excluding those subjects.
--------------------------------
Figure 3 is around here
--------------------------------
We tested the hypothesis that mean investment equals the Nash equilibrium
investment (8) first by pooling investments across rounds.  Because each subject made 15
investment choices the data are clearly not independent.  Therefore, we accounted for the
panel nature of the data using a random effects error specification vit = ei + ε it, where ei is a
subject-specific error term and ε it is an iid error.  The pooled data strongly reject the Nash
equilibrium (t=3.28), and also reject the Nash equilibrium when spiteful subjects are
excluded (t=4.45) and when spiteful subjects and their opponents' data are excluded
(t=3.75).  We then focused on round by round tests of the Nash equilibrium.  Without
excluding any data, a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the Nash
equilibrium hypothesis in ten out of fifteen rounds at the five percent significance level.
Excluding spiteful subjects' data, this test rejects the Nash equilibrium hypothesis in five
out of fifteen rounds.  Finally, excluding spiteful subjects' and their opponents' data, this
test rejects the Nash equilibrium hypothesis in four out of fifteen rounds.  Nevertheless,
                                                          
7 Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b) observed similar phenomena in Keynesian business cycles and industrial
organization theory.  A small amount of nonmaximizing behavior may cause some amount of changes at
equilibrium that is larger in its magnitude than the losses due to nonmaximizing agents.
8 Note that this spiteful (non-maximizing) behavior would not be observed in a usual two-by-two game.  In
our experimental setting, subjects can choose a slight deviation from an optimal investment strategy.  That is,
the two-by-two game approach is not rich enough to capture economic implications in public goods
environments.
12
the fact that many subjects chose the Nash equilibrium investment indicates that at least
economically the Nash equilibrium has attracting power for the data.9
These Treatment A results lead to the following observation.
Observation 1:
The mean investment across all rounds is significantly less than the Nash equilibrium
investment, regardless of whether spiteful subjects' data are excluded.  Overall, mean investments
were approximately ten percent below the Nash equilibrium.
5. Experimental Results for Treatments B and B’
The session in Treatment B conducted at the University of Tsukuba, the session in
Treatment B at the Tokyo Metropolitan University, and the session in Treatment B’ at the
Tokyo Metropolitan University are called the Tsukuba B session, Tokyo B session, and
Tokyo B' session, respectively. As shown in the appendix, the data from these three
sessions are statistically indistinguishable in virtually all cases. This provides strong
evidence that neither the experiment site (Tokyo versus Tsukuba) nor the experiment
wording (“your opponent” versus “the person you are paired with”) affect choices.
Therefore, in the subsequent analysis we pool the data across the three Treatment B
sessions, i.e., Tsukuba B, Tokyo B, and Tokyo B' sessions.
5.1 Investment Data
                                                          
9 This result is similar to Andreoni (1993) and Chan et al. (1998), who study the crowding out hypothesis in
public good experiments with an interior Nash equilibrium and minimum contribution “taxes” in some
treatments.  In both of these previous experiments contributions were close to but slightly below the Nash
equilibrium prediction when no tax was imposed.
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Figure 4 shows that the distribution of investment pairs in Treatment B are very
different from that of Treatment A (Figure 2).  The maximum frequency pair was (8,7)
with 57 pairs, the second was (11,0) with 44 pairs, followed by (8,8) and (0,0) with 37 pairs
each.
--------------------------------
Figure 4 is around here
--------------------------------
Also unlike Treatment A, the average investment (including the investments of
zero by nonparticipants) changed across rounds in Treatment B.  Figure 5 illustrates that
the average investment in Treatment B was clearly less than in Treatment A, but the
average investment in Treatment B ascended across rounds.  In the late rounds the
average investments in the two Treatments were very similar; for example, in the final
round the average investments in Treatments A and B were 7.0 and 6.47 respectively.  The
average investments were not significantly different by round between Treatments A and
B after round 4, according to the nonparametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test.
--------------------------------
Figure 5 is around here
--------------------------------
Using a random-effects panel data model that is the same as that for Treatment A,
we tested the hypothesis that mean investment equals the Nash equilibrium investment
(8) in the case of both participating.  The mean investment in this case was too low (7.26),
and we rejected the hypothesis (t=4.21).10  However, like the result for Treatment A, a
substantial number of subjects selected the Nash equilibrium, so the Nash equilibrium is
meaningful at least economically in the case of both participating.
                                                          
10 For those who prefer nonparametric tests, we also conducted Wilcoxon signed rank tests separately for each
of the 15 periods. This test rejects the null hypothesis that average investment equals 8 at the five percent level
in 12 of the 15 periods.
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5.2  Participation Data
We next examined whether the participation data in Treatment B were compatible
with the mixed strategy equilibrium of the Hawk-Dove game described in Table 1.  The
null hypothesis is the ESS participation probability of 0.68.  We first conducted a binomial
test separately by round in order to avoid pooling dependent participation decisions made
by the same subject in the same test.  Under the ESS null hypothesis, the probability of
observing 10 non-participation decisions or less out of 60 is less than one percent, and the
probability of observing 12 non-participation decisions or less out of 60 is less than five
percent.  As Figure 6 shows, the participation rate rose as rounds advanced (although a
brief decline was observed in rounds 8 and 9).  The smooth curve is a simple log-linear
regression.  More to the point for this binomial test, the low non-participation rate permits
the binomial test to reject the ESS null hypothesis in 9 rounds of the 15 total rounds (in
rounds 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15) at the five percent (usually one percent)
significance level.
 --------------------------------
Figure 6 is around here
--------------------------------
We also examined the overall participation rates for each of 60 subjects separately.
The mean participation rate was 80% (12 of 15 decisions), and the median participation
rate was 86.7% (13 of 15 decisions).  Note that the ESS rate of 0.68 implies on average
slightly more than 10 participation decisions.  Only 14 of the 60 subjects (23.3%)
participated 10 times or less, while the other 46 subjects (76.6%) participated 11 times or
more.  15 of the 60 subjects (25%) were apparently using a pure strategy, as they
participated in 15 out of 15 periods. Using the 60 separate subject observations, the data
15
reject the ESS prediction of 0.68 at better than the 0.0001 significance level using the non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Furthermore, we conducted a binomial test of the mixed strategy of p = 0.68
separately for each subject.  Under the null hypothesis that subjects play this mixed
strategy, participation decisions--even for an individual subject--are statistically
independent.  At the five percent significance threshold, 23 of 60 subjects (38.3%)
participated too much (either 14 or 15 times), rejecting p = 0.68; 6 of 60 subjects (10%)
participated too little (7 times or less), rejecting p = 0.68 in the other direction.  At the ten
percent significance threshold, 32 of 60 subjects (53.3%) participated too much (13, 14 or 15
times), rejecting p = 0.68; 9 of 60 subjects (15%) participated too little (8 times or less),
rejecting p = 0.68 in the other direction.
5.3  Why were Participation Ratios High?
In order to understand these rather high participation ratios, consider the case in
which only one subject in a pair participated in the voluntary contribution mechanism.
When a subject did not participate in the mechanism, the other could obtain her
maximum units of payoff by investing 11 (see Table 2).  There were 139 observations with
exactly one participant.  In these cases the participant invested eleven 43 times, invested
less than eleven 95 times (zero 17 times, invested one 3 times, invested two 7 times,
invested three 8 times, invested four 7 times, invested five 1 times, invested six 16 times,
invested seven 19 times, invested eight 9 times, invested nine 6 times, and invested ten 2
times), and invested more than eleven (twenty-four) only 1 time.  In fact, the mean
investment (6.90) was lower than when both subjects participated!  Using a random effects
16
model, we soundly reject the hypothesis that mean investment equals 11 in the case of one
participant (t=8.14).11
As shown in Table 2, by investing 11 in response to the other not participating, the
non-participating subject earns 8278 while the participating subject earns 2658.  On the
other hand, by investing 7 in this situation, the non-participating subject earns 4018 while
the participating subject earns 2210.  That is, the reduction of the participant's payoff
(448=2658-2210) was relatively small, while the reduction of the non-participant's payoff
(4269=8278-4018) was relatively large.  This appears to be stronger evidence of spiteful-
like behavior than we observed in Treatment A.  The “spite rate”, which is the ratio of the
number of participants investing less than 11 to the number of observations with a single
participant, is equal to 95/139 = 68%.
One might say that in the two-stage game of Treatment B, the low investment by
the single participant could be interpreted as belonging to a tit-for-tat strategy to “teach”
others to cooperate.  Because subjects were re-paired with a new opponent each period
and never interacted with the same subject in more than one period, however, such a
strategy is not subgame perfect. Furthermore, although there is no need to take a tit-for-tat
strategy at the final period of the experiment, the spite rate of the final period is equal to
6/9 = 67 percent.12
Our interpretation that this behavior is spiteful hinges on the low contributions
made by subjects when they are the only participant.  An alternative interpretation of
altruism is also consistent with our finding that the participation rate exceeds the ESS
prediction; altruistic subjects should always participate.  Altruists, however, should also
                                                          
11 The nonparametric Wilcoxon test rejects the null hypothesis that average investment equals 11 at the five
percent level in 9 of the 15 periods, even though the average sample size per period is only about 9 because of
the high participation rate.
12 The full distribution of the 9 final period observations with exactly one participant is as follows: one
participant invested two, one participant invested seven, three participants invested eight, one participant
invested nine, and three participants invested eleven.
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invest as least as much as the level that maximizes their own earnings—which is 11 in the
case of a single participant—if not more, since the non-participant’s earnings strictly
increase in the participant’s investment (see Table 2).  Therefore, choices below 11 are
inconsistent with pure altruism.  These choices could, however, be consistent with notions
of “inequality aversion” or reciprocal altruism advanced recently by some researchers (for
example, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Levine (1998)).  What we refer to as spite in this
context is a response to the nonparticipation of one’s opponent, so it is a form of (negative)
reciprocity.13
 --------------------------------
Figure 7 is around here
--------------------------------
Figure 7 shows average payoffs by round depending on participation.
Curve α denotes the average payoffs when both subjects participated in the mechanism.
As Table 1 shows, the payoff should be 7345 according to the Nash equilibrium prediction,
but actual data showed that average payoffs were less than 7000 units in all 15 rounds.
Curve β denotes the average payoffs when only the other participated in the mechanism.
According to the Nash equilibrium, this should lead to 8278 units of payoff, but actual
payoffs were less than 6000 in 12 of 15 rounds.  According to Table 1, curve β should be
above curve α, but Figure 9 shows that curve α was above curve β in all but round 9.  That
is, participation became a dominant strategy even in early rounds, as illustrated in Table 5.
--------------------------------
                                                          
13 This is different from simple rivalistic behavior in which a subject seeks merely to earn more than his
opponent earns.  The data are inconsistent with such rivalistic motivations, because such motivations are more
likely to lead to less participation than the ESS prediction since nonparticipation guarantees payoffs greater
than or equal to those of the opponent.  It is also unlikely that rivalistic choices would be so close to the Nash
equilibrium when both subjects participate because rivalistic subjects have a strong incentive to reduce their
public good investment.
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Table 5 is around here
--------------------------------
Our interpretation of this conversion to the dominant strategy game is based on
subject learning and proceeds roughly as follows.  After inspection of the payoff tables,
some subjects initially do not participate in the mechanism hoping the other will
participate and invest 11.  They therefore expect (perhaps with the ESS probability of 0.68)
to receive a payoff of 8278.  However, since their participating opponent invested less than
11, the subject realized that her earnings in this subgame fell below 6000 on average.  After
learning this, she chose to participate in the mechanism in later rounds and frequently
earned more than 6000.14
5.4  Learning Processes for Participation
Essentially, subjects learn (contrary to the ESS equilibrium) that expected profits
from participation tend to exceed those from non-participation.  In this final subsection we
provide a simple model of this learning process.  Many alternative approaches to learning
have been advanced recently in the literature, including reinforcement learning (e.g., Erev
and Roth, 1998), belief-based learning, and creative hybrid approaches (e.g., Camerer and
Ho, 1999). Rather than provide an exhaustive evaluation of the various learning models
                                                          
14 As Figure 9 in the appendix shows, the average participation rates at early rounds in the Tokyo B session
were relatively high.  To see why this happened, we looked at the record sheets for the four practice periods,
since the experiences of subjects in the practice periods might affect their participation decisions in the actual
experiment.  We found that spiteful behavior during the practice periods would lead to high participation
rates in early periods.  First of all, we counted the number of subjects who explicitly wrote that they realized
that non-participation was not beneficial because the participant would act spitefully in the practice periods.
This number in the Tokyo B session (8) was much larger than both that in the Tokyo B’ session (1) and that in
the Tsukuba B session (1).  We also calculated the number of subjects who had no chance to experience spiteful
behavior in the practice periods.  Consider a subject who experienced the following: (a) no cases in which only
one subject participated, or (b) if only one subject participated (either himself or his opponent), the payoff-
maximizing (non-spiteful) investment was selected. Call such a subject a "spite-free" subject.  The number of
spite-free subjects in the Tokyo B session was 5,  the number in the Tokyo B' session was 8, and at the number
in the Tsukuba B session was 11.  As the number of spite-free subjects was larger, the participation rate at
period 1 was smaller.
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using our data, we simply report results of an adaptive, reinforcement-based learning
model. In particular, we estimate a probit model in which the probability of participation
depends on the ratio of expected participation earnings (EPE) to expected non-
participation earnings (ENE):
(2)                                   Probability(Participation) = f(EPE/ENE)
The next step is to specify the process underlying subjects' expectations.  We use
two polar cases for this simple model:  (1) Cournot (or myopic) expectations and (2)
Fictitious Play expectations (e.g., Cheung and Friedman, 1997; Cox and Walker, 1998).
According to Cournot, EPE are simply the realized earnings the last time the
subject participated; and ENE are simply the realized earnings the last time the subject did
not participate.  In other words, subjects maintain a very short (myopic) memory length--
of one observation for each (participate or not) decision.  By contrast, according to
Fictitious Play, subjects have a long memory, and each observation updates the
expectation with a declining weight.  For example, if a subject has participated N times up
to this round, and they participated in this round, they update EPE as follows:
(3)                   EPE=((N*previous EPE)+current participation earnings)/(N+1).
In other words, as subjects accumulate evidence they simply include it in their running
average of the payoffs from participation for EPE.  ENE is, of course, analogous.15
                                                          
15 For both Cournot and Fictitious Play, we need the expectations to start somewhere when no evidence has
yet accumulated.  For these initial expectations we employ the ESS expected payoffs, which are 5829 for both
EPE and ENE.  Therefore, the EPE/ENE ratio is 1 in round 1.
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The empirical model is probit maximum likelihood, with a random subject effect.
Table 6 presents the estimation results separately and pooled for the three Treatment B
sessions.  For Fictitious Play, the expected payoff ratio is insignificantly different from
zero except in the Tokyo B session, where the coefficient estimate has the wrong sign. For
the Cournot specification, the ratio is significantly positive except in the Tokyo B session.
The positive coefficient on the ratio implies that as the relative profitability of
participation increases, the likelihood of participation increases.  So, we can conclude that
(1) subjects' participation decisions respond to their experience, and (2) subjects appear to
update their expectations in this environment using a short (Cournot) memory length.
--------------------------------
Table 6 is around here
--------------------------------
Summarizing the above observations, we have the following.
Observation 2:
(a)The ESS prediction regarding the participation ratio is rejected.
(b) The participation ratio rises as rounds advanced and the average investment in the final two-
thirds of Treatment B is not significantly different from that in Treatment A.
(c) It seems that the source of cooperation is not altruism or kindness but is spiteful behavior of
subjects.  Subjects learn that non-participation will invoke a spiteful response, which reduces the
payoff of non-participation below the payoff of participation.  This converts participation into a
dominant strategy.
6. Concluding Remarks
We found that the ESS prediction in a Hawk-Dove game was rejected and some
cooperation among subjects emerged across time.  Furthermore, this cooperation did not
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come from altruism or kindness among subjects, but from an optimal response to other
subjects' spiteful behavior.  Acting spitefully in this way is costly, and this kind of spiteful
or negative reciprocal behavior has also been observed recently by independent research
on public goods (Fehr and Gachter, 1998) and in the ultimatum game (Ochs and Roth,
1989 and Prasnikar and Roth, 1992).
In neo-classical economic theory, it is assumed that each agent cares only about
himself and maximizes his own payoff subject to some constraints. If people care about
how they are doing relative to others (for example, see Hume, 1739),16 however, then it is
natural to think that they might often take spiteful actions in an attempt to decrease the
happiness of others. One would think that such spiteful behavior might result in outcomes
that are socially inferior to outcomes arising from the interaction of purely selfish
individuals. We find that the opposite may occur: spitefulness leads to greater cooperation.
This finding suggests a need to rethink our fundamental assumptions of human nature
underlying our models.
  In our experiment, each subject knew that every subject had the same payoff table.
This might trigger spiteful behavior since every subject could understand opponent's
payoff structure.  In future experiments we plan to conduct a systematic exploration of
this information effect.  It is also possible that spiteful behavior is more likely in two-
person games such as this because it encourages relative payoff comparison. Future
experiments can test this conjecture using larger groups. We also leave for future research
a comparison of American subjects to these Japanese subjects in the present environment.
If the propensity for spiteful behavior differs across cultures, outcomes could be
                                                          
16 “Now as we seldom judge of objects from their intrinsic value, but form our notions of them from a
comparison with other objects; it follows, that according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or
misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure.  The misery of
another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery.  The former, therefore,
produces delight; and the latter uneasiness.” (David Hume, 1739)
22
substantially different for these two subject pools.  Finally, the ESS participation rate in the
present experiment was 0.68.  We are currently conducting experiments in which the ratio
is less than 0.5.
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APPENDIX:  Comparisons of Tsukuba B, Tokyo B, and Tokyo B’ Sessions
First of all, we compare investments conditional on participation across the three B
and B’ sessions.  Figure 8 illustrates how the average investment conditional on
participation, which equals the sum of investment numbers for participants divided by
the number of participants, changed from round 1 to 15 for each of the three B and B’
sessions.  The average investments conditional on participation were different in only a
handful of periods according to the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. In 14 of the 15
periods there is no statistical difference between the Tokyo B and Tokyo B’ sessions at the
five percent significance level, which indicates that the “opponent” wording did not affect
investments conditional on participation.17  Likewise, the Tokyo B and Tsukuba B sessions
are not statistically different in 12 of the 15 periods, indicating that investments
conditional on participation differed very little across sites.18
--------------------------------
Figure 8 is around here
--------------------------------
Figure 9 illustrates the average participation rate patterns from round 1 to 15 in
Tsukuba B session, Tokyo B session, and Tokyo B’ session.  There are some statistically
significant differences in the participation rates between the Tsukuba B and Tokyo B
                                                          
17 In period 8 the average investment in the Tokyo B’ session was significantly higher than in the Tokyo B
session.
18 The average investment was significantly higher in the Tsukuba B session in periods 1, 9 and 13.
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sessions in periods 1 and 2.19 After period 2, there are basically no systematic differences
among the participation rates across sessions.20
--------------------------------
Figure 9 is around here
--------------------------------
 Overall, we conclude that there are virtually no statistically significant differences
in the data based on the experiment site or the experiment wording.
                                                          
19 Fisher’s exact test p-values for the Tokyo B versus Tsukuba B comparison are 0.022 in period 1 and 0.020 in
period 2. We discuss the reasons for these differences in footnote 12.  Fisher’s exact test uses the
hypergeometric probability distribution to calculate the exact probability of observing the distribution of
participation rates (and those more unequally distributed) under the null hypothesis of no differences in rates
across treatments.
20 In period 5 the participation rate is significantly higher in the Tokyo B’ session than in the Tokyo B session,
but in period 10 the participation rate is significantly lower in the Tokyo B’ session than in the Tokyo B session.
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Table 2. Detailed Payoff Table
Your
Payoff 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0 706 871 1072 1297 1536 1775 2003 2210 2386 2523 2615 2658 2648 2585 2470 2309 2106 1871 1614 1349 1091 858 669 543 500
1 905 1127 1379 1647 1919 2183 2427 2641 2816 2944 3019 3039 3001 2905 2755 2555 2313 2038 1743 1443 1154 894 685 548 500
2 1186 1465 1764 2072 2374 2658 2913 3129 3297 3411 3465 3456 3385 3252 3061 2819 2534 2217 1881 1543 1220 933 703 552 500
3 1554 1888 2232 2575 2902 3202 3463 3675 3831 3925 3952 3911 3801 3626 3391 3102 2770 2406 2027 1648 1290 973 721 556 500
4 2017 2401 2787 3160 3508 3817 4078 4281 4420 4488 4483 4403 4250 4028 3743 3404 3020 2608 2181 1759 1363 1015 740 561 500
5 2578 3010 3432 3831 4193 4507 4762 4950 5064 5101 5057 4934 4733 4459 4119 3725 3287 2821 2344 1877 1441 1060 760 566 500
6 3244 3718 4171 4590 4960 5272 5515 5681 5766 5765 5677 5504 5249 4918 4519 4065 3568 3045 2516 2000 1522 1106 781 571 500
7 4018 4529 5008 5440 5812 6115 6339 6478 6526 6481 6343 6114 5800 5406 4944 4425 3866 3282 2696 2129 1607 1155 802 576 500
8 4904 5447 5944 6383 6751 7038 7237 7340 7345 7250 7056 6765 6385 5924 5393 4806 4179 3532 2886 2265 1696 1206 825 582 500
9 5907 6475 6984 7422 7779 8043 8209 8271 8225 8073 7816 7458 7007 6472 5867 5207 4508 3793 3084 2407 1789 1259 849 588 500
10 7031 7616 8130 8561 8897 9132 9257 9270 9168 8951 8624 8193 7664 7051 6367 5628 4854 4067 3292 2555 1886 1315 874 594 500
11 8278 8873 9384 9800 10109 10306 10384 10339 10173 9886 9482 8970 8359 7661 6892 6070 5217 4354 3509 2710 1987 1372 899 600 500
12 9653 10250 10750 11142 11416 11567 11589 11480 11242 10877 10390 9791 9090 8302 7444 6534 5596 4654 3736 2871 2092 1432 926 606 500
13 11158 11749 12229 12589 12820 12916 12875 12694 12376 11925 11349 10656 9860 8976 8022 7019 5992 4967 3972 3039 2201 1494 953 613 500
14 12796 13372 13824 14144 14323 14356 14243 13982 13576 13033 12358 11565 10667 9681 8627 7526 6406 5292 4217 3213 2315 1559 982 620 500
15 14570 15123 15538 15808 15925 15888 15694 15344 14844 14199 13420 12520 11514 10419 9258 8055 6836 5631 4473 3394 2433 1626 1012 627 500
16 16484 17003 17372 17583 17630 17513 17229 16783 16179 15426 14535 13521 12399 11191 9918 8606 7285 5984 4738 3582 2555 1695 1042 635 500
17 18539 19016 19328 19471 19439 19232 18850 18299 17583 16714 15704 14568 13324 11995 10605 9180 7751 6350 5013 3777 2681 1767 1074 642 500
18 20739 21163 21409 21474 21353 21047 20559 19893 19057 18064 16926 15661 14290 12834 11320 9776 8235 6730 5298 3978 2812 1841 1107 650 500
19 23086 23447 23617 23594 23374 22960 22355 21566 20602 19476 18203 16803 15296 13706 12063 10395 8737 7123 5593 4187 2947 1917 1141 659 500
20 25583 25870 25954 25832 25504 24972 24241 23319 22218 20951 19536 17992 16342 14614 12835 11038 9257 7531 5899 4403 3087 1996 1176 667 500
21 28231 28433 28420 28190 27743 27083 26217 25154 23907 22491 20924 19230 17431 15556 13636 11704 9796 7953 6214 4625 3231 2078 1212 676 500
22 31034 31141 31020 30670 30094 29296 28285 27071 25669 24095 22370 20516 18561 16533 14465 12393 10354 8388 6540 4855 3380 2162 1249 685 500
23 33993 33993 33753 33273 32557 31611 30445 29071 27505 25764 23872 21852 19733 17546 15325 13106 10930 8838 6877 5092 3533 2248 1287 694 500
24 37111 36993 36622 36001 35135 34030 32699 31155 29416 27500 25432 23239 20949 18595 16214 13843 11525 9303 7224 5337 3691 2337 1326 703 500
Your Investment Number
Your
Payoff 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
0
1
2 1484 2446 3066 3246 2902 2127 1200
Your
3
Opponent's
4
Investment
5 3245 4512 5057 4921 4109 2821 1460
Number
6
7
8 5705 7036 7332 6749 5383 3536 1724
9
10
11 9122 10295 10154 8952 6883 4364 2024
12
13
14 13575 14338 13553 11545 8620 5310 2364
15
16
17 19132 19206 17555 14548 10603 6376 2743
18
19
20 25855 24939 22187 17973 12838 7567 3163
21
22
23 33800 31573 27472 21836 15336 8887 3626
24
Table 3.  Rough Payoff Table
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Figure 3. Average Investments in Treatment A.
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Figure 4. Investment Pattern in the Three Treatment B Sessions.
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Figure 5.  Comparison of Average  Investment Patterns:
 Treatment A versus Treatment B.
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Figure 6. Participation Rate Pattern.
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Figure 7.  Average Payoffs by Participation Decision.
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Table 5. The average values of payoff data up to round 5 
               for the three treatment B sessions.
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Dependent Variable =  1  if Participate
                                         0  if Not Participate
Probit Model with random subject effect
     Model (1):  Cournot Expectations Model (2):  Fictitious Play Expectations
Variable or Statistic Tsukuba
B
Tokyo
B
Tokyo
B
B and B
Pooled
Tsukuba
B
Tokyo
B
Tokyo
B
B and B
Pooled
Expected Participation Earnings/
Expected Non-Participation Earnings
0.051*
(0.022)
-0.044
(0.043)
0.086**
(0.031)
0.028*
(0.015)
-0.013
(0.054)
-0.132*
(0.064)
0.131
(0.193)
-0.002
(0.025)
Intercept 0.618**
(0.187)
1.279**
(0.224)
1.126**
(0.241)
1.010**
(0.115)
0.915**
(0.211)
1.312**
(0.240)
0.935**
(0.222)
1.073**
(0.120)
Rhoa 0.382*
(0.165)
0.339
(0.221)
0.447*
(0.191)
0.344**
(0.100)
0.280*
(0.137)
0.371*
(0.176)
0.382*
(0.193)
0.333**
(0.094)
Number of Observations 300 300 300 900 300 300 300 900
Estimated Log-likelihood -147.3 -123.7 -129.8 -405.6 -149.0 -122.7 -130.0 -406.7
Restricted (slopes=0) Log-likelihood -161.6 -136.5 -145.8 -450.1 -161.6 -136.5 -145.8 -450.1
Standard errors in parentheses.
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level; ** denotes significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level (all two-
tailed tests except for Expected Participation Earnings/Expected Non-Participation Earnings).
aRho is a standard Hausman test statistic for the presence of random effects.
Table 6.  Results of Probit Participation Model
Figure 8.  The Average Investment Patterns Conditional on Participation
in Tsukuba B, Tokyo B, and Tokyo B' Sessions.
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Figure 9. The Average Participation Rate Patterns
in Tsukuba B, Tokyo B, and Tokyo B' Sessions.
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